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Events can be modeled through a geometric approach, representing event structures
in terms of spaces and mappings between spaces. At least two spaces are needed to
describe an event, an action space and a result space. In this article, we invoke general
mathematical structures in order to develop this geometric perspective. We focus on
three cognitive processes that are crucially involved in events: causal thinking, control
of action and learning by generalization. These cognitive processes are supported by
three corresponding mathematical properties: monotonicity (that we relate to qualitative
causal thinking and allows extrapolation); continuity (that plays a key role in our activities
of action control); and convexity (that facilitates generalization and the categorization
of events, and enables interpolation). We define how such properties constrain events
representations and relate them to thinking about events. We discuss the relevance
of the three constraints for event segmentation and explore the implications of such
constraints for semantics. We conclude by a discussion that relates our approach to
other accounts of events.
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INTRODUCTION
Events lead a double life, Davidson (1967) remarked more than 40 years ago. They still do. We
refer with ease to actions and events in ordinary talk, and reason without effort about them. Still,
their conceptual structure and the way we use it for our basic cognitive activities remain to a large
amount an open issue (Pianesi and Varzi, 2000; Zacks and Tversky, 2001).
While notions of events in philosophy and science may diverge, they all agree that events
involve participants and relations between them (Casati and Varzi, 2008). Thus events are relational
concepts (Gentner and Kurtz, 2005). Yet the nature of such relations has not been systematically
analyzed.
In earlier work (Gärdenfors and Warglien, 2012; Warglien et al., 2012a; Gärdenfors, 2014), we
have suggested a geometric approach to event conceptualization and shown how the semantics of
verbs provide a fundamental window over the geometric structure of event concepts. The key idea
is to represent event structures in terms of spaces and mappings between spaces. At least two spaces
are needed to describe an event, an action space and a result space. For us, the temporal structure
of events is not defining, but it emerges from the interactions of the components of an event. This
is in contrast, for example, with Zacks and Tversky (2001) that focus on the temporal structure of
events. For them an archetypical event is “a segment of time at a given location that is conceived by
an observer to have a beginning and an end” (Zacks and Tversky, 2001, p. 3).
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In this article, we invoke general mathematical structures (Jost,
2015) in order to develop this geometric perspective by analyzing
three important properties of event mappings that constrain the
structure of the event and support fundamental cognitive uses
of event concepts. We focus on three cognitive processes that
are crucially involved in thinking about events: causal thinking,
control of action and learning by generalization. These cognitive
processes are supported by three corresponding mathematical
properties: monotonicity (that we relate to qualitative causal
thinking); continuity (that plays a key role in our activities of
action control); and convexity (that facilitates generalization and
the categorization of events). We argue that these constraints
play a central role in the ‘working model’ of an event (Zacks
et al., 2007; Radvansky and Zacks, 2014). In mathematical
terms, monotonicity rests on an order structure, continuity
is a topological notion depending on a notion of proximity,
and convexity is a geometric concept, utilizing the notion of
betweenness.
In Section “A Two-Vector Representation of Events,” we
briefly summarize the building blocks of a geometric model of
events, the space representing the forces generating the events,
and the result space representing changes induced by such forces.
An event is specified by the mapping between these spaces. In
Section “Three Qualitative Principles for Events,” we describe the
three properties that constrain such a mapping. These constraints
are supported by research on naive physics, qualitative causal
reasoning, action perception, psychology of motor control, and
cognitive linguistics. In Section “Mathematical Correspondences
of the Constraints,” we define the mathematical correspondences
to the constraints. Sections “Event Structure and Semantics” and
“Manner and Result Verbs” explore the implications of such
constraints for semantics. Our paper does not directly focus on
the problem of event segmentation that has been in focus in
much of research on events (e.g., Radvansky and Zacks, 2014).
However, we discuss the relevance of the three constraints for
this area in Section “Contributions to Working Models and
Segmentation.” We conclude by a discussion that relates our
approach to some other accounts of events.
A TWO-VECTOR REPRESENTATION
OF EVENTS
When we talk about events, we clearly imply a relational
structure. For example, linguists resort to a thematic role
structure where the basic roles are agent and patient (Dowty,
1991; Levin and Hovav, 2005). When we think about everyday
physical phenomena, we conceive of events as relations between
causes and effects. When we make plans, we consider different
actions and their consequences. These three perspectives reveal
different aspects of the same underlying structure, which is an
asymmetric relation between two entities.
This abstract common structure of events in language,
physical thinking and planning can be naturally interpreted in
geometric terms. The structure can be modeled as a mapping
between vector spaces. The action and the result components of
the event can then be represented as vectors in the two spaces.
Such a geometric perspective on events can be found in the
work of several authors (e.g., Talmy, 1988; Wolff, 2007, 2008,
2012; Croft, 2012; Gärdenfors and Warglien, 2012). In order
to model events, the spaces involved must be characterized
more precisely. Building on previous work on conceptual
spaces (Gärdenfors, 2000, 2014; Gärdenfors and Warglien, 2012;
Warglien et al., 2012a), we characterize both spaces as vector
spaces. The action space can be conceived as a space of forces (or
force patterns) acting upon some target entity, the properties of
which are described in the result space. As the result component
of the event represents changes in the properties of the target, the
result space can also be modeled as a vector space. The changes
are typically changes of location or changes of object properties.
For example, when Lucy opens the door, the agent Lucy exerts
a force vector (action) on the door that leads to a change of the
position of the door (result). Or in the event of the wind bending
the antenna, the force of the wind (action) leads to a change of the
shape property of the antenna (result). While both spaces have
the same geometric structure, they represent different types of
vectors: forces have a different nature than changes in properties.
In the limiting case when nothing changes, that is, when the result
vector is the identity vector, the event is a state.
The target entity of the event is called the patient and the result
vector describes the changes of the properties of the patient. If
there is an entity that generates the action vector it is called the
agent. There exist, however, events without agents, for example
events of falling, drowning, dying, growing and raining.
The mapping between the force space and the result space is
what characterizes the event. For example, pushing a cupboard
sometimes results in the cupboard moving, sometimes not;
shooting a moose sometimes kills it, sometimes not. In such
cases the mapping between the force vector and the result vector
qualifies two different events.
The nature of event mappings has been little investigated and
in our earlier work (Gärdenfors and Warglien, 2012; Warglien
et al., 2012a; Gärdenfors, 2014) we have not developed the
properties of the mappings. The new contribution of this paper
consists of an analysis of three general principles for such
mappings that highlight central aspects of human reasoning
about events. All three principles can be expressed in qualitative
terms, reflecting the qualitative nature of everyday thinking about
events.
The event model captures a basic sense of causation: the action
causes the result. Most accounts of causation analyze the relation
between the action and the effect as a relation between two
events (see e.g., Zacks and Tversky, 2001). In contrast, our model
views causation as a relation within an event by introducing a
distinction between forces and changes of states (cf. Wolff, 2007,
2008, 2012). Unlike many other theories, our model does not treat
causes and effects as symmetrical entities: they belong to different
domains – causes to the force domain and results to change in
location (in the case of movements) or in some property domains
(color, size, weight, temperature, etc.).
A geometric approach to events also allows a natural
representation of event categories. An event category is often
characterized by similarities of results or similarities of actions.
For example, events of opening a door cover a large range of
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different changes in the position of the door. Similarly, pushing
a door involves a large range of forces exerted on the door
(some of which result in the door moving, some not). These
event categories are based on similarities in action or result
space. This is in line with a general claim that similarity is
fundamental for concept formation (Nosofsky, 1988; Goldstone,
1994; Gärdenfors, 2000). The importance of result and action
categories is reflected in the fact that a lexicon typically represents
such categories rather than specific events (Warglien et al.,
2012a). As we will discuss later, when categories of events involve
both similar actions and similar results, for example in jump
or dive, similarity also matters when analyzing the mappings
between spaces.
While the two-spaces model of events is meant to capture
mostly qualitative features of event representations, it can
provide more precise and testable propositions (and approximate
modeling strategies). For example, experimental studies suggest
that individuals can perform intuitive addition of force vectors
when observing how simultaneous sources of force affect a
patient trajectory (Wolff, 2007). Classical experiments based on
Michotte’s “launching” paradigm (Michotte, 1963) show that the
attribution of causality in an event depends on the angle of
the trajectory of a hit object B with a hitting object A – which
demonstrates that individuals decide whether an animation
captures a single (causal) event or two disjoint ones on the ground
of the mapping of forces to trajectories. Recent research has
shown the perception of such mapping to be remarkably accurate,
and a good predictor of “causal impression” (White, 2012).
In all these cases, simple two-spaces models of events provide
good approximate predictions of individual perception of causal
events and the satisfaction/violation of such predictions affects
the evaluation of what constitutes an event. This paper further
specifies relevant constraints on elementary event representation.
THREE QUALITATIVE PRINCIPLES
FOR EVENTS
Our general theoretical hypothesis is this: Events as such can
be arbitrarily complicated. To get a mental grip on them, we
break them up into more elementary constituents, and these
constituents are assumed to satisfy some general structural
constraints. To express those basic constituents, we have
appropriate verbs at our disposal. Those verbs model a mapping
from a force space into a result space. These spaces can often be
assumed to be vector spaces or to have at least properties similar
to vector spaces. This metaphor also applies to social interactions
where we are confronted with intentions additionally to physical
forces. To understand events and apply verbs in situations that
interpolate or extrapolate from known ones and to predict the
outcome of small variations in the input, we utilize structural
constraints. Let us now be more specific.
The core of our model of events is the mapping between the
two spaces – the force space and the result space. Although other
theories of events (Talmy, 1988; Wolff, 2007, 2008; Croft, 2012)
also recognize the importance of such a mapping, they do not
analyze it. Here our main aim is to show that, although the
mapping is in general not fully specified, it respects some general
constraints that still make the model cognitively productive. In
this section, we present three constraints that correspond to our
understanding of causation, control of action and generalization.
In the following section, we show that these constraints have
fundamental mathematical expression in terms of monotonicity,
continuity and convexity of the mapping.
Larger Forces Lead to Larger Results
(Monotonicity Constraint)
When the outcome of an action is very hard to predict given
ignorance of counter-forces and approximate understanding of
causal laws, the effect of actions can still be understood in
qualitative terms. A very general constraint is that, whatever
counter-forces and other forces are present in a given situation,
increasing the action force will also increase (or at least not
decrease) the magnitude of the effect. For example the effects
of pushing an object may vary widely depending on the friction
of the surface. Nevertheless, pushing the object harder means
that it moves further (or at least does not move in the other
direction). This ordinal principle implies a sort of ceteris paribus
thinking: Other counter-forces can be of varying magnitude
and direction, but no matter what they are, ceteris paribus, the
change of effect is predictable from the change of the action
force.
Given the unknown nature of the counter-forces, the direction
of effect need not be the same as the direction of the force
vector. For example an unknown side wind may effect the
direction of the movement of a motorboat, so that the direction
of the movement driving force of the motor may become
oblique in relation to the driving force of the motor direction
of the movement (Wolff, 2007). Still the general monotonicity
constraint is valid: If the force of the boat motor is increased, the
speed of the boat will increase.
The reason the constraint is cognitively important is that
it captures our understanding of how a change of an action
will change the outcome. This is a basic step in understanding
causality (Hume, 1748/2000; Wolff, 2007, 2008) and in making
causal inferences. A related motivation is that the monotonicity
principle implies at least a qualitative predictability of the effects
of action.
Monotonicity can also support the reverse inference process.
It has been observed that “an effect is attributed to the one of its
possible causes with which, over time, it covaries” (Kelley, 1973).
When needing to identify causal factors among multiple potential
ones, monotonicity can provide a powerful selection criterion,
that captures an ordinal covariation principle. For example, the
tides have been observed as long as humans have existed, but
it was only when the monotonic correlations to the moon’s
position and distances was discovered that we understood the
force vectors causing the tides.
Motion events are fundamental for our understanding of the
physical world. Yet there are systematic discrepancies between
our intuition of motion and its physical reality (McCloskey
et al., 1980; Caramazza et al., 1981). These discrepancies reveal
how we conceptualize events. In particular, naïve intuitions of
motion tend to follow the scholastic notion of impetus developed
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by medieval natural philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition.
The impetus is thought of as keeping the object moving after
it has separated from the source of the force. According to
the conception, objects slow down and finally stop because the
impetus gradually diminishes (Dijksterhuis, 1950; Duhem, 1958;
Maier, 1968). By ignoring the counter-forces of resistance, this
view preserves a simple monotonic relation between impetus
and speed: a diminishing speed is explained by the diminishing
impetus. Even when individuals consider counter-forces such as
friction, these are in turn interpreted as having a monotonic
effect: more effort generates greater results, but greater resistance
reduces results. diSessa (1983) has labeled such monotonicity
properties “Ohm’s phenomenological primitive” claiming that
this primitive is a basic building block of our intuitions about
physical reality.
While monotonicity is easily defined in one dimension,
it is a more problematic notion when multiple dimensions
are involved. Changes in the force vector may involve
different directions of change in different dimensions and
then monotonicity may not hold. Either process is monotonic,
but since they take place along different dimensions, they
are not naturally combined into a single monotonic process.
Consequently, the monotonicity constraint can be expected to
apply only when the changes go in the same direction. In the case
of causal inference, this common direction is called “qualitative
synergy” (Wellman, 1990).
Monotonicity also enables qualitative causal inferences. First
of all, it allows making purely ordinal inferences about the
relationship between causes and effects. For example, while
different individuals may react with different intensity to a
medical treatment, making quantitative predictions difficult, one
can still predict that larger doses of the treatment will have larger
effects, independently of the person that is treated. Mill (1843)
called this form of causal inference “the method of concomitant
variations.”
Moreover, if causal relationships are monotonic, inferences
over whole chains of cause-effect relationships can be made,
allowing assessments of indirect causation. Wellman (1990)
suggests two operators that allow to chain causal relations. One
is reduction: two chained positive monotonic relations can be
reduced to a single one. The other is inversion: a chain of a
positive and a negative monotonic relation reduces to a negative
one. These operations are easily illustrated. When you press the
accelerator pedal of your car harder, the engine operates at a
higher speed, and as a result, the car runs faster. These two
actions, that of the driver and that of the engine, get reduced to
the single one of accelerating the car. In contrast, in order to see
inversion, when you want to brake, you step on the brake pedal,
and the brakes then decelerate the car. Thus, there is a positive
action, activating the brake, and a negative one, reducing the
speed of the car, and the two actions are reduced to the single
negative one of braking the car. As both operators reduce a chain
of two relations to a single one, they can be used iteratively to
reduce even longer chains of relations.
The chaining of causes plays an important role in the structure
of events that involve instruments. Actions involve in many
cases instruments, and it is not uncommon to represent the full
event through a compressed version of it. For example, we can
define an event as “the hammer broke the window” although
we understand that some agent broke the window through the
instrumental use of a hammer. We submit that such typical
compression of instrumental events is made possible by the
chaining of causal effects which is enabled by monotonicity.
By transferring its force to the instruments, the agent endows
the instrument of a kind of derived agency, which allows the
construal of a reduced representation of the event itself.
Monotonicity applies also to non-physical types of events, of
a more social or moral nature. For example, more unfair offers
will cause more resentment. Again, monotonicity makes it easy
to compose a chain of causal structures: more greed will cause
more unfair offers that will cause more resentment, which can be
contracted to “more greed will cause more resentment.”
Obviously, not every relation between cause and effect is
monotonic. We only claim that the relation between the exerted
force and its effect is typically monotonic. To understand this
better, let us discuss the example of rotations. Here, the motion
is obviously non-monotonic. The only monotonic relation is
that between the exerted force and the angular velocity. In fact,
the mental effort involved in the processing of rotations is an
increasing (approximately linear) function of the rotation angle,
see e.g., Ellis and Young (1988) and the discussion in Breidbach
and Jost (2006). No such phenomenon seems to occur for
translation movements. This indicates that the non-monotonic
nature of rotations as opposed to that of translations requires
an increased mental effort – which, by the way, is monotonically
increasing itself.
When throwing an object, the distance achieved is a non-
monotonic function of the horizontal angle. But this does not
contradict our general principle that the effect is a monotonic
function of the force applied. For the same angle, the distance
increases as a function of the force with which the object is
thrown.
Also, many optimization problems appear to be non-
monotonic in nature. In economic optimization, the profit
achieved is the product of the price per unit and the number of
units sold. The latter, however, typically is a decreasing function
of the price per unit. Thus, non-monotonicity here results
because a monotonically increasing function is multiplied by a
decreasing one. That is, in order to see the monotonicity, we need
to break up the effect into more elementary constituents.
Small Changes in the Force Lead to
Small Changes of the Result (Continuity
Constraint)
The continuity constraint says that small changes in force should
lead to small changes of the result. The constraint is an expression
of our sense of control. When we want to change the effect only
by a small degree, we can achieve that by applying a sufficiently
small change of effort. When we turn the steering wheel a little
more to the right, we expect the car also to move a little more to
the right, and not to make a U-turn. When we hit the tennis ball
a little harder, it will fly a little faster and further, but not move
wide out of the court. And when we boil the egg a little longer, it
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will become somewhat harder. Large changes in force could still
lead to small changes of the result, but, expressing it in qualitative
terms, the continuity constraint forbids that small force changes
produce large effect changes.
The continuity constraint is more demanding in terms of
structure, since it requires more than ordering relations (see next
section). This structural cost comes with a benefit since it allows
finer predictions of the causal effects of actions. In particular,
this makes the effects of our actions quantitatively controlled.
This is clearly important for learning many motor skills where by
fine-tuning our actions we want to modify the effect to a precise
degree. Monotonicity alone would not be sufficient here, because
that would tell us only that a stronger effort would lead to a
stronger result, but not help us in predicting to what extent we
need to increase our effort in order to achieve a precise degree of
increase of the effect.
Motor control, in general, requires the fine-tuning of an agent’s
forces (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). For example, balancing
a pole requires very small adjustments in the neighborhood
of the equilibrium position. Another example concerns how
people unintentionally coordinate their actions as when they walk
at the same pace. A fascinating laboratory example concerns
two persons sitting in two rocking chairs with different natural
rocking frequencies (Richardson et al., 2007). The experiment
shows that individuals spontaneously coordinate their rocking
frequencies in patterns closely resembling classical coupled
oscillator dynamics. This illustrates well the importance of
continuous adjustments in motion events. If the adjustments
were not continuous, it would be difficult to achieve coordinated
movements.
Intuitively, continuity corresponds to drawing or tracing a line
without jumps. The precise mathematical formulation involves
the concept of a limit, and it is usually expressed in terms of
Weierstrass’ ε-δ formalism. In fact, continuity can be expressed
in purely topological terms. We only need a qualitative notion
of proximity (see Continuity). Intuitively speaking, a mapping is
continuous if whenever one wants to have similar effects, then it
suffices to make forces sufficiently similar.
While the continuity constraint is a very general organizing
principle, it is important to realize that it does not always apply.
In fact, the cases where it does not apply need a treatment of their
own. Consider the example where you are stretching a rubber
band. The initial results of increases in force will be continuous
changes in length, but eventually a critical point will be reached
where the band breaks. In more general terms, we see here a
discontinuous phase transition occurring when an obstructing
counterforce is suddenly overcome, and a qualitatively new
result is achieved. Thus, at or near the transition point, a
very small change of effort produces a large result, and the
mapping from force to effect is discontinuous. The monotonicity
constraint, at least when not interpreted in the strict sense, i.e.,
that strictly larger forces lead to strictly larger results, will still
apply. Monotonicity is a qualitative principle that neither needs
continuity nor a quantitative substrate as provided by a metric.
In some cases, such a discontinuous phase transition may
mark a cognitive separation between two different events, like
handling or destroying something, cooking or burning, bending
or breaking. There is an asymmetry here, however. We can
bend a twig to a varying degree, but when we break it, this
results in a single state that is no longer amenable to a degree
of quantification. Therefore, a more fruitful cognitive perspective
seems to consist in distinguishing between continuous and
discontinuous events.
As we shall elaborate in Section “Applications,” verbs
expressing continuous events can be modified by adverbs that
serve to express the degree of the effort or force applied. No
such modification, however, is possible for verbs that express
discontinuous phase transitions. Such verbs typically express the
transition between only two possible states, that before the force
is applied and that resulting from its application. Before you
smash the window, it is intact, and after you have smashed it,
it is broken. Neither state is considered to be amenable to a
degree of quantification. This is a binary situation. In contrast,
for continuous events, a continuum of possible degrees and states
is assumed.
Again, the constraint of continuity extends well beyond
the domain of physical events. In some types of phenomena,
like most economic ones, assumptions of continuity are very
common. For example, most market events commonly satisfy
the constraint of continuity. However, there may be cases in
which straightforward analysis can be challenging due to the
heterogeneity of the factors involved. For example, historical
events present a mixture of continuity and discontinuity along all
dimensions of social structure. Events such as revolutions (Sewell,
1996) are highly multidimensional events where cascading
transformations of many dimensions, located in different
moments, coexist with the continuity of other domains. Indeed,
the choice of the scope of discontinuities is often used to
draw the boundaries of the event itself (see again Sewell,
1996). It is striking that most of the time such complex events
are expressed through their projection on simple (and often
metaphoric) representations in which the continuity constraint –
or its violation – carries important structural information about
the most salient dimensions. These metaphoric representations
usually project these complex multidimensional events on simple
physical domains where prototypical notions of continuity
and discontinuity are better understood (e.g., the fall off the
Roman empire). The use and abuse of such metaphorical
projections provides, in our view, strong support to the cognitive
cogency of the continuity constraint and its physical prototypical
sources.
Intermediate Results Are Caused by
Intermediate Forces (Convexity
Preserving Constraint)
An even stronger demand on the cognitive structure of events
is to impose a distance measure, i.e., a metric on the spaces
involved in the mapping. This allows us to define betweenness
and convexity (see Convexity) on the spaces. The convexity
preserving constraint on the event mapping f can then be
formulated as: if the force vector z is between force vectors x
and y, in the sense that they all point in the same direction, but
the strength of z is between those of x and y, then the result f(z)
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is between the results f(x) and f(y). In other words, intermediate
forces lead to intermediate results1.
Thus convexity is fundamentally involved in the process of
learning new concepts (see Gärdenfors, 2000, Ch. 3; Gärdenfors,
2001). From a cognitive point of view, convexity is closely related
to generalization: It allows us to make inferences over whole
regions from a limited number of observations. In general,
feedback control mechanisms presume that the mapping from
actions to result is convexity preserving. For example, when
you are shooting with a cannon you can control the horizontal
and vertical direction of the cannon. If you have tried to
settings x and y for the cannon and observed the landing
points f(x) and f(y) of the projectile, you presume that an
intermediary setting will lead to an intermediary result. Similar
principles apply to many cases of motor control. For example,
Runesson and Frykholm (1981) showed subjects movies of a
person lifting objects of different weights. The subjects could
not see the object themselves but only the movement patterns
of the person doing the lifting. Nevertheless, the subjects were
very accurate in predicting the weights of the object. This
would not be possible, unless the mapping from forces to
results (object being lifted) is convexity preserving: From the
movement patterns, the subject could infer the forces exerted
by the person lifting the box and then (implicitly) infer that
intermediary forces corresponded to intermediate weights of the
boxes.
In the case of events, the convexity preserving constraint
allows to generalize over sets of events and thus to form event
categories. The convexity preserving constraint therefore has a
fundamental cognitive property: It allows moving from categories
of action and categories of result to categories of events. More
precisely an event category is a convexity-preserving mapping
from categories of action to categories of result. For example, in
a “jump” event, both action and result are implied. On the force
side, a pattern of forces with a vertical component (and gravity
as a counterforce). On the result side, a movement with a vertical
component. Convexity in this case implies that given two jumps,
a jump which is between those in terms of force exerted and
direction of the movement will be also called a jump. Of course,
events may in general imply too complex mappings between force
and result to be captured by a single word, in which case they can
be expressed by composing a force and a result expression, like in
“driving into town.”
Convexity turns out to be of great importance whenever a
problem of categorization or classification of events is at stake
also in complex action domains such as those object of the legal
domain. The domain of law provides important examples of
application of convexity principles to the interpretation of events
that do not have just a physical nature. For example, in the
contract law, it is often important to determine which type of
event happened, in order to know whether a contract has been
fulfilled or not. In all these cases, defining a convex range of
performances (acts and acts outcomes attributes) within which
a given performance happens determines the attribution of the
1Although the notion of convexity can be generalized to non-metric spaces, as long
as betweenness can be defined.
event to one type or the other (for a classical law school case, see
Frigaliment vs. BNS).
The three qualitative constraints that we have presented here
are organizing principles that govern the mapping from causes to
results. They allow general and robust inferences independently
of the counter-forces that are present and of the initial conditions
of the action. Each qualitative constraint leads to a different
type of inference, extrapolation in the case of monotonicity,
interpolation for convexity, and effect control for continuity.
We view them as principles that considerably improve the
cognitive economy of our causal thinking. Like all cognitive
simplification strategies, they have their limitations, and there
do exist cases where they don’t apply. We expect, however, that
such cases require a higher mental effort than those where the
principles apply. For instance, boomeranging is a very surprising
phenomenon.
The three constraints involve different mathematical
structures, as will be described in detail in the next section.
Therefore, neither of them can be derived from the others.
Here are also some simple examples that they are independent
of each other when constraining events. Periodic motions are
recurrent and therefore not monotonic (although their speed
will typically depend monotonically on the force exerted), but
they are usually continuous. The example of a boomerang just
mentioned is a more exotic case. – Result verbs usually describe
non-continuous effects, called phase transitions in physics. At
the critical point, exerting just a little more force may break a
window. Monotonicity holds, since utilizing a stronger force
on another window will also break it. Convexity also applies
in the sense that when two force magnitudes each suffice to
destroy a window, any intermediate one will do as well. If one
stretches a spring, the elastic energy acquired will depend on
the force exerted within a certain range, and in that range,
convexity holds. When the force exceeds a critical threshold,
however, instead of an elastic, we get a plastic deformation,
and monotonicity ceases to hold. More abstractly, while we
may still interpolate within a tested range of validity of a
phenomenon, where convexity holds, we may not be able to
extrapolate beyond that range, and a prediction based on a
monotonicity assumption outside that range may not be valid.
Whether or not a discontinuous phase transition occurs in such




Our general thesis for cognitive processes dealing with events
is that they are fundamentally guided by some formal
principles that are based on general mathematical structures.
The structures that we identify here are monotonicity (order),
continuity (topology), and convexity (geometry). We shall now
describe those structures in turn and explain how they lead to
principles that constrain the mapping between forces and results
in the event model. A detailed reference for the mathematical
concepts is Jost (2015).
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Monotonicity
The first concept is that of an ordering structure. For example,
time and numbers are ordered, but space is not. An ordering
gives us essentially a one-dimensional arrangement. For our
purposes, actually, a more general concept suffices, that of a
preorder. A preorder is a binary relationship ≤ on a set X with
the properties that for every element x, we have x ≤ x, and if two
elements satisfy both x ≤ y and y ≤ x, then x = y, and if we have
for three elements x ≤ y and y ≤ z, then also x ≤ z. When we
want to have an order, and not only a preorder, we require that for
any two distinct elements precisely one of the two relations x ≤ y
and y ≤ x is satisfied. Thus, with a preorder, we may not be able
to decide which of two elements is the larger one, but when we
have an order, this can always be decided. In the sequel, we shall
assume for simplicity that we have orders, and not only preorders,
but the subsequent reasoning applies mutatis mutandis also to
preorders.
Definition 1: Let X and Y be ordered sets, with both orderings
denoted by the same symbol ≤ . A mapping f: X→Y is called
monotonic if x ≤ y implies f (x) ≤ f (y) for all x, y in X.
Thus, a monotonic map from X to Y preserves the ordering.
Our first constraint that larger forces lead to larger results
corresponds mathematically to that the mapping from forces to
results is monotonic.
As explained, an ordering is essentially a one-dimensional
structure. In contrast, the space of forces will often have more
dimensions. The constraint nevertheless applies, because a force
vector will select a direction, and along this dimension, forces can
be ordered according to their strength. And if the counterforce
is constant, the application of such a directed force should
also select a direction in the result space. Thereby, the relation
between forces applied in a specific direction and the resulting
effects becomes a relation between ordered structures, and
the constraint applies: Stronger forces applied in the selected
direction lead to stronger results in the enforced direction.
Continuity
The mathematical structure of a topology turns a set into a space.
A set simply is the collection of its elements, and as such it is
structureless and amorphous. A topology on a set introduces a
notion of nearness or vicinity. A topology on a set distinguishes
certain of its subsets as “open.” This is meant to indicate that an
open set is a neighborhood for all its members, in the sense that
for each element, it also contains the elements surrounding it.
When we have such a notion of vicinity, we can also formulate
the concept of continuity as preserving the neighborhood
relation:
Definition 2: A mapping f: X→Y between topological spaces is
called continuous if the pre-image under f of any open subset of
Y [denoted f−1(Y)] is an open subset of X.
Then we apply continuity to our transformation from force
to result: The second constraint that small changes in the force
vector lead to small changes of the result vector corresponds
mathematically to that the mapping from forces to results is
continuous.
The notion of continuity in definition 2 is purely qualitative,
basically saying that points that are mapped onto nearby points
in Y are also nearby in X. In order to make it quantitative, one
needs a metric, that is, a function that assigns to any two elements
of a set their distance. This brings us into the realm of geometry.
A metric induces a topology. With a metric, one can then
express nearness (proximity, vicinity) in a quantitative manner.
When the topology of a set is induced in that manner by a
metric, one can follow Weierstrass and formulate continuity in
a quantitative manner. A map f: X→Y between metric spaces,
with metrics dX and dY, is continuous at x if for every ε> 0 there
exists some δ> 0 such that whenever dX(x, y) < δ for any y in X,
we have dY[f(x), (y)] < ε. We can then also impose a continuity
requirement that simultaneously holds for all points x in X.
Definition 3: A map f: X→Y between metric spaces, with
metrics dX and dY, is called uniformly continuous if for every
ε > 0 there exists some δ > 0 such that whenever dX(x1,x2) < δ
for any x1, x2 in X, we have dY[f (x1), f (x2)] < ε.
Convexity
For the third mathematical property, it should be noted that
convexity is defined in terms of betweenness:
Definition 4: A subset C of a space S is called convex, if
whenever x, y are in C, then also all points between x and y are
contained in C.
Betweenness can be defined for many non-metric spaces, for
example for all graphs. An ordering structure also leads to a
concept of betweenness, as will be discussed in a moment.
However, a metric space allows us to formulate notions of
betweenness and thereby convexity in the following way:
Definition 5: Let (S,d) be a metric space. We say that z in S lies
between x, y in S if d(x,y) = d(x,z)+ d(y,z).
If the metric is Euclidean, this entails that z lies on the line
between x and y.
Let us also observe that an order structure also leads to a
concept of betweenness: Here, z is between x and y, if x ≤ z ≤ y.
Note, however, that in contrast to the metric concept where z is
between x and y if it is between y and x, betweenness derived from
an order is asymmetric. If x ≤ y and x 6= y, there might be points
between x and y, but there cannot be any point between y and x.
When we have a map f: X→Y between metric spaces, we may
require convexity preservation. This means that pre-images of
convex sets be convex, or equivalently, that points z between x
and y are mapped to points between f(x) and f(y). Convexity
preservation corresponds mathematically to the third constraint
that intermediate forces lead to intermediate results. Depending
on the geometry, this can be a very restrictive requirement. In
Euclidean space of dimension d ≥ 2 with its usual metric, this
would imply that straight lines are mapped to straight lines, that
is, the map is essentially linear. Thus, we need to restrict the
underlying geometry for the concept to be useful.
We shall also speak of a typical event when the center of a
region in force space is mapped to the center of a region in
effect space. We recall here that we assume that these regions are
convex, and therefore their centers tend to be sufficiently far away
from their boundaries.
When we consider events as mappings f: X→Y between metric
spaces, then the metric of the target space Y can be used to induce
a metric on the event space, by d(f,g): = sup d[f(x),g(x)] where the
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supremum is taken over all x in (an appropriate region of) the
domain X, and where the metric employed is that of Y. With such
a notion of distance in an event space, we can then also introduce
a notion of convexity in event space. An event h is then between
events f and g if for all x, h(x) is between f(x) and g(x). And as
explained, if we have a notion of betweenness, we also obtain a
concept of convexity. Note that this is different from the notion
of convexity for a single event where we had required that the
pre-image of a convex set be convex. Here, we speak about sets
of events and define a notion of convexity in that context. That
is, we no longer compare the application of different forces to the
same events, but rather consider the effect of the same force in
different events.
APPLICATIONS
The three mathematical structures that we have presented and
their corresponding constraints on the mapping from force to
result vectors generate a lot of inferences about events and event
categories. Consequently, the structures that depend on events
will be constrained by these inferences. We therefore believe that
investigations of cognitive representations of events will be very
fruitful in a range of domains.
Event Structure and Semantics
Several of the semantic consequences of the event model are
already presented in Warglien et al. (2012a) and Gärdenfors
(2014). A model of an event can be a complex structure that not
only involves the two vectors, but also a patient and an agent with
their properties, as well as counter-forces, instruments, recipients,
intentions, etc.
Even though the mental model of an event may be complex, a
sentence normally captures only certain features of a construal
generated from a particular focus on the event (see Croft and
Wood, 2000, Ch. 3; Langacker, 2008, Ch. 3, for a survey). By
analogy with the visual process – where we can only focus our
attention on some features of the visual field – a construal focuses
only on certain parts of an event. The sentences “Victoria hits
Oscar” and “Oscar is hit by Victoria” describe the same event
with the aid of two different construals, where Victoria and Oscar,
respectively, are put in focus. Gärdenfors (2014, p. 177) proposes
that a construal of an event contains as least one vector (force or
result) and one object (patient or agent). Then he puts forward
the thesis (ibid., p. 178) that a (declarative) sentence typically
expresses a construal of an event.
This thesis about sentences implies that at least an agent or
a patient (expressed by a noun phrase) and a force vector or a
result vector (expressed by a verb phrase) are included in what is
expressed. Thus the two main components noun phrase and verb
phrase have to be present in a linguistic description of an event.
The upshot is that given the event model and the thesis about
construals, sentences are indeed central semantic units.
Some individual objects, in particular people and places, are
given names in language. In contrast individual events are seldom
represented in language. Exceptions are mainly historical events,
e.g., the Flood, The French Revolution, the Second World War.
However, event categories are often represented by nouns, e.g.,
birth, illness, marriage, football match.
After these general remarks about the role of events in
semantics, let us now turn to the role of monotonicity, continuity
and convexity in semantics.
The fundamental role of monotonicity from a semantic point
of view is manifested in the ordinal nature of most modifiers
of lexical categories related to events. This can be demonstrated
by the use of adjectives and adverbs in modifying the assumed
force and result vectors. In fact, many adjective pairs, e.g., “high”-
“low,” ”strong”-“weak,” “hot”-“cold,” “heavy”-“light,” only apply
to ordered structures – so called scalable adjectives (see e.g.,
Paradis, 2001, 2008). Scalable adjectives also have comparatives:
“higher,” “hotter,” “heavier” etc. The comparatives clearly depend
on an ordering structure. Also for concepts with a prototypical
structures, a partial ordering can be defined in terms of the
distance to the prototype. Thus a color can be “greener” and a
person can be “healthier.”
Adverbs typically exhibit ordinal properties as well. For
example, the adverb “softly” in “Victoria hits Oscar softly”
selects a sub-region of the force space where the value on the
dimension of the strength of the force is relatively low (an
ordering property). If monotonicity is assumed, then the value
on the corresponding result dimension, i.e., pain, will also be low.
So the inference in this case is that Oscar will only feel a mild pain
(if any at all).
Next we come to the principle of continuity. Many verbs
represent force or result vectors of events in which there is
a continuous mapping between the two types of vector, for
example, “heat,” “stretch” and “press.” As will be explained
in Section “Manner and Result Verbs,” there are verbs that
express violation of such continuity such as “cut” or “break”
(Majid et al., 2007). Such verbs typically express the transition
between only two possible states, that before the force is applied
and that resulting from its application. A notable difference is
that verbs expressing continuous events can be modified by
adverbs that serve to express the degree of the effort or force
applied. No such modification, however, is possible for verbs
that express discontinuous phase transitions. For example one
can “press strongly” (until something breaks), but one cannot
“break strongly.” Of course, such transition verbs can be modified
by adjectives addressing other dimensions. For instance, one
can “break the window intentionally,” but already “breaking the
window violently” requires some special context to be a viable
expression.
Another difference is that verbs expressing continuous events
the process are, in general, reversible, which is often represented
by verb pairs such as push–pull, heat–cool, expand–shrink, etc.
In contrast verbs for discontinuous transitions are not reversible:
a stick that has been broken cannot be made “unbroken” and a
child who is born cannot be “unborn.”
As regards the convexity constraint, Gärdenfors (2000, 2014)
proposes that concepts are represented by convex regions in
conceptual spaces. In particular actions can be represented as
convex regions of patterns in force space (Gärdenfors, 2007;
Gärdenfors and Warglien, 2012). Now suppose that you hear
or read the sentence “Victoria hit Oscar.” Since you have no
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further information about the event, you interpret “hit” as a
prototypical instance of hitting, i.e., close to the center of convex
and continuous region of force space (or more generally action
space) representing hitting. And from previous experience you
know that this center is mapped into the interior of a region of
pain space, for instance close to its center. In other words, you
infer that hitting Oscar, or any other person for that matter, with
a prototypical force, i.e., one located at the center of the force
region, causes him pain. Since the pain region is also convex, its
center prototypical area is located away from its boundary. Then,
if the mapping from the force to the pain region is continuous,
you assume that when Oscar is hit by Victoria the force is
close to the prototypical one and you therefore conclude that
the result will also be close to the center that part of the pain
region.
The continuity and convexity constraints thus let us infer that
when we are near a typical event then similar actions produce
similar results, under the implicit ceteris paribus assumption.
A third example is Slobin et al. (2014), who studied
how subjects named the actions shown in 34 video clips of
different types of motion events such as walking, running
and jumping, asking participants to name as specifically as
possible the type of motion they just saw. Subjects were native
speakers of English, Polish, Spanish, and Basque. A pairwise
similarity matrix was created: for each participant and each
pair of clips it was determined whether a pair of clips
was called by the same term (1) or not (0). Then the
individual participant matrices were summed to create a single
language similarity matrix. Based on these matrices a two-
dimensional multidimensional scaling solution was calculated.
The solution shows for all languages four distinct, convex
regions emerge corresponding to walking, running, crawling
and to non-canonical motion (such as leaping or galloping).
These results, and similar results from Malt et al. (2014),
provide some support for the convexity thesis for event
concepts.
MANNER AND RESULT VERBS
In linguistics, it is common to distinguish between manner verbs
and result verbs (see e.g., Rappaport Hovav and Levin, 2010; Levin
and Rappaport Hovav, 2013). According to Rappaport Hovav and
Levin (2010, p. 21) “manner verbs specify as part of their meaning
a manner of carrying out an action, while result verbs specify the
coming about of a result state.” Result verbs group together verbs
describing motion with verbs that describe property changes
because of the tendency to give the same linguistic construction
to a changing entity as to a moving one: Both involve changes
of properties, which the manner verbs do not. The distinction is
supposed to be exhaustive (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 2013):
Any particular use of a verb is either a manner verb or a result
verb (but not both).
On our event model the distinction comes out very naturally:
manner verbs refer to force vectors of events while result verbs
refer to result vectors. Another way of expressing this is to
say that the manner/result distinction is basically a cause/effect
distinction: manner verbs refer to causes and result verbs to
effects.
When the monotonicity property can be assumed to hold, we
can profile an event by either a manner or result verb without
much loss of information. For example, when we say we pushed
a table the default assumption is that some effect was produced,
proportional to the intensity of the force exerted. Conversely,
when using a result verb the default assumption will be that a
force in the same direction was exerted by the agent (“I moved
the table to the next room”). However, when such an assumption
breaks down, we need to provide a more complete profile of
the event, typically by introducing one more verb or suitable
modifiers.
A follow-up question to the manner/result distinction is why
there are no verbs that cover both the force and result vectors of
an event. Our explanation, presented in Warglien et al. (2012a)
builds on learnability constraints: Since the mapping between
actions and results depend on counterforces and other contextual
factors, such a mapping will be hard to learn and subject to
many contingencies and sources of instability. For example,
one’s understanding of the patterns of forces exerted by one’s
arms is well integrated and the movement of an object in three
dimensions is likewise integrated, but the relationship between
the two is unstable, being subject to external counterforces and
other uncontrollable factors.
A good example is when we have to account for the
influence of counterforces. Mental models of events often contain
counterforces such as supporting surfaces or friction, but their
presence is in general not expressed. Important questions are then
when and how counterforces can be expressed linguistically.
A general rule seems to be that counterforces are made
explicit if and only if they prevent, obstruct or diminish the
result expected from the application of the force under ordinary
circumstances, or if they have the capacity to do so and
therefore need to be overcome (Talmy, 1988). Linguistically,
such breaks of expectation are typically expressed by ‘but’
constructions (Gärdenfors, 1994): “I pushed (manner) the coffin
as hard as I could, but it did not move (result).” Sometimes,
also facilitating forces can be expressed when they amplify
the result beyond what is normally expected. In both cases,
the additional forces move the result vector away from the
prototype.
If you want to express a counterforce, it will function as
a second cause and should be represented as a force vector.
According to our account of events, you then need another
event expression where the counterforce is the force vector.
Consequently, linguistic expressions of counterforces will in
general involve embedded clauses in a sentence that expresses the
main event.
Talmy (1988) develops a schematic formalism that, for
example, allows him to represent the difference in force patterns
in expressions like “The ball kept rolling because of the wind
blowing on it” and “The ball kept rolling despite the stiff grass.” In
our terminology, the phrases “because of the wind blowing on it”
and “despite the stiff grass” are embedded structures that express
the secondary event based on the vector generated by a facilitating
or a countering force. (To be precise, in the example above, the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 August 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1391
fpsyg-09-01391 August 13, 2018 Time: 9:52 # 10
Gärdenfors et al. From Actions to Effects
blowing wind is not a counterforce, but rather is a facilitating
force since it goes in the same direction as the ball. Nevertheless
it functions as a secondary force.)
Talmy’s (1988) analysis of force dynamics supports this
conclusion. His dynamic ontology consists of two directed forces
of unequal strength, the focal called “Agonist” (corresponding
to what is called the force vector in the present article) and
the opposing element called “Antagonist” (corresponding to the
counterforce here).
A second way to express counterforces is to use modal verbs.
Again, modal verbs involve another verb expressing a primary
force (or the result of such a force). Many modal verbs relate
to a counterforce. For example, in “I let the dog come in,” “let”
expresses the removal of a counterforce (by opening a door).
Or in “The dog may not come in,” the presence of a potential
counterforce is made explicit.
A special case of causation occurs as a result of the intentions
of an agent. The distinction between non-intentional and
intentional sometimes shows up in result verbs. The classical
case is kill versus murder. The latter is intentional, while the
former is undetermined with respect to intentionality. Thus,
murder cannot occur with non-intentional agents. Some events
involving intentions, such as those describe by give, buy and
sell, can be construed from either of two perspectives: physical
causation or intentional causation leading to the fulfillment of a
goal. Such a situation can still be expressed with the aid of a single
verb, since the fulfillment of the intention presupposes a physical
action, for example the transition of an object from an agent to a
recipient.
Contributions to Working Models
and Segmentation
Psychological research on events has dedicated much attention
to how complex flows of activities are segmented into simpler
event entities by readers, observers or even direct participants
(Zacks and Swallow, 2012). Our three constraints do not (and
cannot) constitute a theory of such event segmentation, as we are
here concerned with the structure of elementary, “atomic” events
rather than with more complex event architectures. However,
the three constraints may indirectly contribute to a better
understanding of the segmentation process.
A central construct of psychological models of event
segmentation is the working model. Event segmentation models
submit that individuals hold at each moment (and for a
given time scale) a single working memory representation
of an event – what Zacks et al. (2007) define as the
working model of the event. Working models of an event
support the systematic effort of observers and participants to
predict the future in response to current perception. Thus,
working models need to be quite coarse and stable models
of the event, a kind of static snapshots that are robust
enough to remain buffered from the variations associated with
the fine details of sensorial inputs (Radvansky and Zacks,
2014).
Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks et al., 2007) explains event
segmentation as the result of updates in working models which
respond to increases in predictive error of a current working
model. According to the model, event boundaries correspond to
such update activity. This entails that as long as the content of the
working model does not violate the developments in the world,
an event is continued.
We suggest that our three constraints may characterize the
internal structure of working models and enrich the notion of
what constitutes a “predictive error,” that is, a surprise. We thus
consider our proposal as complementary to theories of event
segmentation.
First of all, the three constraints clearly contribute to the
buffering of working models from the details of perceptual inputs
and to generate robust predictions. Monotonicity drastically
simplifies causal inference, requiring only ordinal information
on causes to infer ordinal properties of effects. Monotonicity
helps to extrapolate and guide the prediction of causation in
the working model. Continuity ensures that small changes in
a neighborhood of effects are associated with small changes
in causes. It thus predicts that observed variations in effects
should be related to similar causes. Finally, convexity ensures
that it is enough to know two event mappings to know what
is in between them. Thus convexity helps to interpolate - for
example to predict unspecified properties of the event. One
could summarize by saying that the three properties ensure
ordinal, topological and geometrical robustness to working
models – and that they enable robust inference about causation,
control of action and generalization. For example, in a narrative
that only specifies a few snapshots of a story, the three
constraints can help the reader or listener to fill in missing
information.
Second, violations of three constraints provide a clear source
of surprise that may lead to the update of a working model.
Imagine that I am telling you that I made a trip from Venice
to Paris. Then, for example, going to Lyon and then back
to Milan before flying to Paris would violate monotonicity.
Similarly, a long stopover at Milan would create a loss of
continuity. Violations of convexity can also generate surprise.
For example, if I am mentioning a trip from Venice to Paris,
it would be surprising to find that the trip goes through
Moscow.
Moreover, the three properties allow some natural forms
of aggregation of elementary events. Monotonicity allows the
reduction of multiple causal mappings into composite ones.
For example the overarching event that somebody dies because
he eats too much is a composition of the monotonicity of
eating more leads to an increase in weight, which leads to
increased coronary problems, which in turn leads to a higher
probability of dying. Thus composition of events is facilitated by
monotonicity. Convexity leads to a different types of aggregation,
based on the creation of (convex) categories of events such as
walking or running (Malt et al., 2014; Slobin et al., 2014) –
as long as motion falls within a convex category, no changes
in the motion component will be detected across elementary
events. Continuity entails that even if a new event is initiated,
many features of the previous event, such as the location
of objects, do not change drastically (Magliano and Zacks,
2011).
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DISCUSSION
In addition to our earlier work on event structure, we have in
this paper introduced three general cognitive constraints on event
mappings and shown how they can be translated into well-known
general mathematical properties of mappings. The mathematical
properties have broad implications for how we reason about
events and for the semantics of natural language. Our approach
unifies several areas since it brings out what is common to causal
thinking, control of action and learning by generalization.
Human cognition does not seem to be plagued by the frame
problem that has dogged the symbolic approach to AI, i.e., the
problem how to describe the effects of actions succinctly without
having to represent also all the trivial side effects or obvious non-
effects of those actions. Rather, framing is a basic condition for
perception and knowledge as such (Mammen, 2017). Apparently,
humans use certain general principles to automatically infer
(non-)consequences of actions, and those then no longer need
to be represented explicitly. We believe that in this paper, we
have identified three such principles, monotonicity, continuity
and convexity.
While the three properties are presented in a specific model of
events, they also apply to different accounts as long as they rely
on some type of geometric representation. Our three constraints
can be applied to the force dynamics of Talmy (1988), the causal
models of Wolff (2007, 2008) and the event representations in
Croft (2012). For example, the monotonicity constraint should
apply whenever forces are analyzed in their causal role.
We conclude by a few notes on how the geometric approach
relates to some of the problems concerning event representation
that are discussed in the contemporary philosophical, linguistic
and psychological debate.
Two main issues in such debates are lexical aspect (Aktionsart)
and causality. We have not discussed aspect (Vendler, 1967),
because it does not involve directly the mapping between
the action and the effect spaces. However, we suggest that
the typology of aspects follows more coherently from an
ordinal treatment of time as a succession of (sub)events rather
than by locating events on a Euclidean time line. Indeed,
considering aspects in terms of bounds over the timeline
(open/closed induces the telic non-telic distinction, while point
vs. interval induces the instant/duration distinction) generates an
anomaly: semelfactives, which are simultaneously non telic and
instantaneous, would have to correspond to “open” (unbounded)
points, which don’t exist in the standard topology of the line. On
the other side, considering only ordered sequences of discrete
time points allows to define duration as multiple points vs.
instantaneous as single point, and telic vs. non telic as having
or not having an end point. In this case a semelfactive just
corresponds to a point which is not an end point (see Warglien
et al., 2012a for a more detailed analysis of aspect).
Recently, there has been a strong growth of models of causal
reasoning in terms of Bayesian networks. This approach has
normative value, but it makes too strong claims about people’s
ability to reason about probability distributions and to compute
Bayesian updates. Sloman (2005, p. 103) claims that “people
represent the qualitative structure of causal systems without
accurately representing all quantitative details” (see also Sloman
and Lagnado, 2015). In support of this, he notes that causal
reasoning makes use of the monotonicity property: “On the flip
side of the qualitative/quantitative divide, we do have access to
some quantitative knowledge. We know that stepping harder
on the accelerator pedal turns the wheels more than stepping
lightly” (Sloman, 2005, p. 104). In addition, Waldmann and
Hagmayer (2013) argue that people represent more aspects
of the mechanisms of causality than the Bayesian formalism
can encompass. The upshot is that we do not consider the
Bayesian approach to be cognitively realistic. Our point is
rather that the use of the general principles of monotonicity,
continuity and convexity obviates the need for much of Bayesian
reasoning.
On another front, our approach is resonant with the tradition
starting from Davidson (1967) that associates events and
causality. He writes that “events have a unique position in the
framework of causal relations between events” (Davidson, 1967,
p. 179). However, our model moves causality inside events.
On our approach an event can become a cause of another
event only as far its result vector can be transformed into a
force vector. For example, when a driver turns the wheel in
a car, her force results in a circular movement of the wheel.
The driver immediately perceives that this result is transformed
into forces that result in a change of the direction of the
car. On our approach, this process involves two events, where
the result vector of the first becomes the force vector of the
second.
To turn to the favorite example of philosophers – billiard
ball collisions – a good illustration of when the transformation
from result vector to force vector breaks down is provided by
Michotte’s (1963) experiments on the perception of collision
events. By changing the angle of the trajectory of the second
object after the collision, subjects clearly show a threshold beyond
which the recognition of a causal event breaks down. This
suggests that the subjects rely on an intuition of how trajectories
translate into forces.
Our view of the role of causality in event structure is much
closer to the one that has emerged in cognitive semantics. Like
our approach, this tradition puts causality inside the event. It
also emphasizes the paradigmatic function of two thematic roles,
agent and patient, which are clearly connected to our two spaces
(for a comparison see Warglien et al., 2012a). For example, Croft
(2012) presents a geometrical model that shares many features
with ours. However, a difference from our approach is that Croft
does not develop the force aspect of the event (Warglien et al.,
2012b). We believe that by taking into consideration the three
constraints that have been analyzed in this paper, linguists will
be able to explain several semantic aspects related to events, in
particular in relation to the semantics of verbs. This may help to
reconcile the two lives of events.
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